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Double-Interval Societies
Maria Klawe, Kathryn L. Nyman, Jacob N. Scott, and Francis Edward Su*
Abstract. Consider a society of voters, each of whom specify an approval
set over a linear political spectrum. We examine double-interval societies, in
which each person’s approval set is represented by two disjoint closed intervals,
and study this situation where the approval sets are pairwise-intersecting:
every pair of voters has a point in the intersection of their approval sets. The
approval ratio for a society is, loosely speaking, the popularity of the most
popular position on the spectrum. We study the question: what is the minimal
guaranteed approval ratio for such a society? We provide a lower bound for the
approval ratio, and examine a family of societies that have rather low approval
ratios. These societies arise from double-n strings: arrangements of n symbols
in which each symbol appears exactly twice.
1. Introduction
Consider the voting model of Berg et. al.[1] in which a political spectrum X is
viewed as a continuum, with liberal positions on the left and conservative positions
on the right, and in which each voter v “approves” an interval of positions along
this line. For example, a tolerant moderate might approve a wide interval near the
middle of the line, while an intolerant partisan may approve a narrower interval
near one of the ends.
More formally, a society is a spectrum X together with a set of voters V and
a collection of approval sets {Av}, one for each voter. A point on the spectrum X
is called a platform. In our situation, we imagine X to be R, and each approval set
Av is a closed interval that represents the set of all platforms that v approves.
Now suppose that every pair of people can agree on some platform; that is, their
intervals overlap. In this situation, Helly’s Theorem [3] implies that there exists a
point on the line that lies in everyone’s approval set, i.e., there is a platform that
everyone approves. Thus a strong hypothesis (pairwise intersecting sets) produces
a strong conclusion (a point in all the sets). However, in voting theory, we are
usually not looking for unanimity, but may be satisfied with a platform that has
high approval ratio: the fraction of voters that approve this platform.
Various authors have relaxed the hypotheses. Berg et. al.[1] define a linear
(k,m)-agreeable society in which voter preferences again are modeled by closed
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intervals in R1. In this society, given any set of m voters, there exists a subset of
k voters whose approval intervals mutually intersect. They prove that there must
exist some platform with approval ratio k−1m−1 . Another generalization by Hardin
[2] looks at approval intervals on a circle rather than a line, and finds that with
(k,m)-agreeability, the approval ratio of the society is at least k−1m .
A, A’:
B, B’:
C, C’:
D, D’:
Figure 1. A pairwise-intersecting society of size 4 with approval
number 3.
We generalize the one-interval model to a society in which every member is
identified with two disjoint approval intervals and call such a society a double-
interval society. This situation may arise naturally in the context of voting to
account for voters who do not place candidates along a linear spectrum in exactly
the same order, or to account for voters who find disjoint sets of platforms appealing
for entirely different reasons (e.g., for being a party purist, or having the ability
to work across party lines). In a scheduling context, such intervals might model a
society of workers, each of whom has two different work shifts.
Figure 1 illustrates a double-interval society with four voters. The approval
sets of each voter have been separated vertically so they are easier to see. Note
that the approval sets are pairwise-intersecting: each voter overlaps every other
voter in one or both of their approval intervals. In this example, there are several
platforms approved by three voters, but no platform is approved by all four. The
approval number of a platform a(p) is the number of voters (in a society S) who
approve of platform p. The approval number of a society a(S) is the maximum
approval number over all platforms in the spectrum X. That is
a(S) = max
p∈X
a(p).
Finally, define the approval ratio of a society to be the approval number of S divided
by the number of voters in S.
The main question we address in this paper is: what is the minimal approval
ratio of a pairwise-intersecting, double-interval society with n voters?
Examples suggest that the minimal approval ratio of such societies is 1/3; that
is, there is always a platform that will get at least a third of the votes. Our results
in this paper attempt to clarify this intuition.
We will first examine a family of double-interval societies with low approval ra-
tios that have regular patterns of interval overlap. These arise from the construction
of what we call double-n strings, defined in the next Section. The combinatorics
of such strings are quite nifty and provide a lower bound for the approval ratio of
societies in this family (Theorem 3.6) as well as an upper bound (Theorem 3.7) for
societies in this family. Roughly speaking, the double-n strings produce societies
with asymptotic approval ratios between 0.348 and 0.385.
We will also prove a general lower bound for the approval ratio of any pairwise-
intersecting, double-interval society in Theorem 4.1, which shows the approval ratio
is always greater than 0.268.
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Then we ask if we can find specific societies with lower approval ratios than
the ones arising from double-n strings, and discover that there are such examples.
We find them by modifying the construction that comes from double-n strings. See
Table 1. However, all of these examples have approval ratio greater than or equal
to 1/3.
2. Double-n String Societies
Double-interval societies with regular patterns of interval overlap can be rep-
resented by double-n strings, that is, strings of length 2n containing exactly two
occurrences of each of n symbols. At times we will also represent double-n strings
as strings of the symbols 1, . . . , n. We define the distance between two distinct
symbols in a double-n string to be the minimum distance between a pair of occur-
rences of the symbols, where the distance between two adjacent symbols is taken
as 1. The diameter of a double-n string is the maximum over all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n of
the distance between i and j. We will call two entries in the list adjacent if their
positions in the list differ by no more than the diameter of the string.
Let δ(n) be the minimum diameter over all double-n strings.
A
A
B
B
C
C
D
D
E
E
Figure 2. A society represented by the double-5 string ABCDEBECAD.
We can construct a pairwise-intersecting double-interval society from a double-
n string with diameter d by assigning intervals of equal width to the symbols, long
enough so that each interval overlaps the intervals of the d symbols to its right and
left.
For example, consider the double-5 string ABCDEBECAD. This string has
diameter 2, since any pair of symbols A through E appear somewhere in this list
separated by at most one other symbol (e.g., the second occurrences of A and E in
this string are distance 2 apart). We build a society from this string by assigning
intervals of equal width as in Figure 2. This society has approval number 3 as can
be seen since the right endpoint of A’s first interval intersects the left endpoint of
C’s first interval, and both intersect B’s first interval. Hence we see that δ(5) ≤ 2
(and in fact δ(5) = 2). Note that in general the approval number of a society with
an underlying double-n string is one more than the diameter, that is, a(S) = d+ 1.
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3. Asymptotic approval ratios for double-n string societies
If S is arises from a double-n string with diameter d, then since a(S) = d+ 1,
we see that the minimal approval ratio of such a society is (δ(n) + 1)/n. By taking
limits, we see that
∆ = lim
n→∞
δ(n) + 1
n
= lim
n→∞
δ(n)
n
is the asymptotic approval ratio for societies arising from double-n strings. In this
section, we will show that
8/23 ≤ ∆ ≤ 5/13.
It is clear that for n > 1 we have δ(n− 1) ≤ δ(n) since for any double-n string we
can form a double-(n−1) string of no larger diameter by deleting both occurrences
of the n-th symbol. Given a double-n string S we label the symbols as 1, 2, . . . , n
according to the left to right order of their first occurrence within S.
It is easy to see that ∆ ≤ 1/2 since the double-n string 1, 2, . . . , n, 1, 2, . . . , n
shows that δ(n) ≤ n/2 for n at least 2. In fact, we can show δ(n) < n/2 for n at
least 3. Although this does not change the upper bound on ∆, we will need this
result for the lower bound 8/23 ≤ ∆.
Lemma 3.1. If n > 2, then δ(n) < n/2.
Proof. The case δ(3) = 1 follows from the double-3 string 1,2,3,1,2,3 and
the case δ(4) = 1 follows from the double-4 string 1,2,3,4,1,3,2,4. The proof for
the general case n > 4 is based on this double-4 string. Let r = bn/4c. We will
partition 1,2,. . . ,n into four strings S1, S2, S3, S4 where each is of length r or r+ 1
depending on the value of nmod 4. We prove the result by looking at the diameter
of the double-n string T (n) = S1, S2, S3, S4, S1, S3, S2, S4.
Suppose n = 4r for some positive integer r. We let Si be the string (i− 1)r +
1, (i− 1)r + 2, . . . , ir of length r and it is easy to check that the diameter of T (n)
is 2r− 1 and we have 2r− 1 < n/2. For n = 4r+ 1, let S1, S2, S3 be as before and
let S4 be the string 3r + 1,. . . ,4r + 1 of length r + 1. Now the diameter of T (n) is
2r, and again we have 2r < n/2 as desired. For n = 4r + 2 we set S1 and S4 to
have length r and S2 and S3 to have length r+ 1. Consider b in Si and c in Sj with
i < j. It is easy to see that unless i = 2 and j = 3, the distance between b and
c in T (n) is at most 2r since at least one of Si and Sj has length r and the other
has length at most r + 1. Moreover, for b in S2 and c in S3 the distance between
b and c in T (n) is at most r + 1 since both of the substrings S2, S3 and S3, S2
occur in T (n). Thus the diameter of T (n) = 2r and we have 2r < 2r + 1 = n/2.
Finally for n = 4r + 3 we set S1 to have length r and S2, S3, S4 to have length
r+ 1. In this case it is easy to see that the diameter of T (n) is 2r+ 1 and we have
2r + 1 < 2r + 3/2 = n/2. 
For simplicity, without loss of generality assume that if the first occurrence of
symbol m occurs at position i in a double-n string, then all symbols at positions
1 ≤ j < i are less than m (otherwise this condition can be satisfied by a permutation
of the symbols in the double-n string). From Lemma 3.1, it is sufficient to consider
double-n strings that have diameter less than n/2. It is also easy to obtain the
lower bound ∆ ≥ 1/3 as shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.2. Let r be a positive integer. We have δ(3r + 1) ≥ r.
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Proof. Let n = 3r + 1. In any double-n string of diameter d, the first occur-
rence of the symbol 1 can be adjacent to at most d other symbols while the second
occurrence can be adjacent to at most 2d. Because 1 must be adjacent to all n− 1
other symbols, d+ 2d ≥ n− 1 = 3r, and so d ≥ r. 
Lemma 3.3. In a double-n string with diameter d, the first n − d symbols are
distinct (and hence in the order 1, 2, . . . , n− d).
Proof. Assume that there exists some symbol x both of whose occurrences
are within the first n−d entries. Thus the first occurrence of n must be at position
at least n+1, so the distance between x and n is at least d+1, a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.4. Let d < n/2 be the diameter of a double-n string, and let ri be the
number of symbols both of whose occurrences are within d of either occurrence of i
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d+ 1. Then ri ≤ 3d+ i− n.
Proof. As d < n/2, Lemma 3.3 gives that the first d + 1 symbols of such a
double-n string are 1, 2, . . . , d+ 1. For 1 ≤ i ≤ d+ 1, there are only i− 1 symbols
before the first occurrence of i, so there are at most 3d+ i− 1 symbols adjacent to
i, of which ri of them are repeats. Hence n− 1 ≤ 3d+ i− 1− ri. 
Corollary 3.5. For 1 ≤ i ≤ d + 1, and d < n/2, at most 3d + i − n of the
symbols 1, 2, . . . , iˆ, . . . , d + 1, are within d of the second occurrence of i. (Here iˆ
means omit i).
Proof. This follows directly from Lemma 3.4 since each of the symbols 1, . . . , iˆ,
. . . , d+ 1 occurs within d of the first occurrence of i. 
We are now ready to prove the lower bound.
Theorem 3.6. Let r be a positive integer. Then δ(23r) ≥ 8r. Thus the asymp-
totic approval ratio for double-n strings is bounded below by 8/23.
Proof. Let n = 23r and let S be a double-n string with diameter d. Suppose
d < 8r. Since d is an integer we have d ≤ 8r − 1. Note that d ≥ δ(23r) ≥
δ(21r + 1) ≥ 7r by Lemma 3.2.
By Lemma 3.3 the first n−d ≥ 23r−8r+1 = 15r+1 symbols in S are distinct
(and in order). Now since d < 8r the first occurrence of the symbol labeled 15r+ 1
is not within d of the first occurrence of i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 7r + 1. Thus for any such i
we must have the second occurrence of i occurring in one of three sets of positions,
namely the block B1 of length d following the first occurrence of 15r+ 1, the block
B2 of length d ahead of the second occurrence of 15r+1, or the block B3 of length d
following the second occurrence of 15r+1. These blocks are illustrated in Figure 3.
Let kj be the number of symbols in 1 ≤ i ≤ 7r+ 1 with their second occurrence in
block Bj . From the preceding observation we have k1+k2+k3 ≥ 7r+1 (conceivably
such a second occurrence of i could be in both B1 and B2 if they overlap).
Note that any pair of symbols in Bj lie within d of each other. Suppose without
loss of generality that the second occurrence of 1 lies in B1. For any i with 1 < i ≤
7r + 1 with the second occurrence of i in B1, both occurrences of i lie within d of
an occurrence of 1, since d ≥ 7r. By Corollary 3.5, the number of such i is at most
3d+ 1− n ≤ 3(8r − 1) + 1− 23r = r − 2,
giving k1 ≤ 1 + r − 2 = r − 1.
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Figure 3. B1, B2, and B3 (in the case that they are disjoint).
Let x be the minimal number such that the second occurrence of x is not in
B1. Then x ≤ r since k1 ≤ r − 1. Without loss of generality suppose the second
occurrence of x is in B2. Again, by Corollary 3.5 there are at most
3d+ r − n ≤ 3(8r − 1) + r − 23r = 2r − 3
symbols i with 1 ≤ i ≤ 7r + 1 other than x in B2, so k2 ≤ 2r − 2.
Similarly, let y be the smallest symbol (in value) whose second occurrence is
in B3 (i.e., is not in B1 or B2). There are at most k1 + k2 symbols in B1 ∪ B2,
so y ≤ 3r − 2. Using Corollary 3.5 one last time, we see that there are at most
3d + (3r − 2) − n ≤ 3(8r − 1) + (3r − 2) − 23r = 4r − 5 symbols i 6= y with
1 ≤ i ≤ 7r + 1 in B3, so k3 ≤ 4r − 4. However, this is a contradiction: we needed
k1 + k2 + k3 ≥ 7r + 1, but
k1 + k2 + k3 ≤ (r − 1) + (2r − 2) + (4r − 4) = 7r − 7.
Therefore we could not have d < 8r, proving the theorem. 
A general argument showing δ(br) ≥ ar, for large r, leads to the inequalities
b < 3a and 23a ≤ 8b. Thus the lower bound of Theorem 3.6 is the best possible
asymptotic bound using this argument. Now we turn to the upper bound.
Theorem 3.7. For any n > 0, there exists a double-n string with diameter
d ≤ 5 ⌈ n13⌉−1. Hence the asymptotic approval ratio for double-n strings is bounded
above by 5/13.
Proof. Note that the double-13 string
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 1, 11, 6, 12, 13, 5, 4, 7, 11, 10, 9, 2, 3, 13, 12, 8
has diameter 4, meaning that any two symbols in it appear somewhere in the double-
13 string separated by no more than three other elements. This yields a general
construction for double-n strings of any length. Let k =
⌈
n
13
⌉
. Then replacing each
symbol i in the above string with the substring
k(i− 1) + 1, k(i− 1) + 2, . . . , ki,
and removing any symbols in the resulting string that are greater than n, yields
a double-n string. An example of this string for n = 34 (k = 3) is shown in Fig-
ure 4. Because the diameter of the above double-13 string is 4, any two symbols
1 ≤ i < j ≤ n are within substrings that are separated by at most three substrings
of length k. Also, i and j are at worst on the far ends of their substrings, giving a
maximum total distance between i and j in the new string of
3
⌈ n
13
⌉
+
(
2
⌈ n
13
⌉
− 1
)
= 5
⌈ n
13
⌉
− 1. 
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(1, 2, 3)(4, 5, 6)(7, 8, 9)(10, 11, 12)(13, 14, 15)(16, 17, 18)(19, 20, 21)(22, 23, 24)
(25, 26, 27)(28, 29, 30)(1, 2, 3)(31, 32, 33)(16, 17, 18)(34)(13, 14, 15)(10, 11, 12)
(19, 20, 21)(31, 32, 33)(28, 29, 30)(25, 26, 27)(4, 5, 6)(7, 8, 9)(34)(22, 23, 24)
Figure 4. A double-34 string with diameter ≤ 14 constructed as
in Theorem 3.7. Symbols are grouped together by parentheses to
elucidate its construction. Some groupings have fewer than three
elements since symbols larger than 34 in value are removed. Empty
groupings are also omitted.
4. A double-interval society lower bound
In the previous section we considered double-n strings as examples of soci-
eties with low approval ratios. These examples give upper bounds for the minimal
guaranteed approval ratio for any society. In this section, we give lower bounds
for the minimal guaranteed approval ratio, by considering how general pairwise-
intersecting double-interval societies force conditions on the number of intervals
that can intersect a given interval at its endpoints. This approach largely ignores
the geometry of the approval sets and considers only combinatorial constraints.
Theorem 4.1. The approval number a(S) of any n-voter society S satisfies
(4.1) a(S) ≥
⌈
2n+
1
2
−
√
3n2 − n+ 1
4
⌉
.
Then the approval ratio satisfies
(4.2)
a(S)
n
≥ 2−
√
3 +
3 +
√
3
6n
−
√
3
24n2
≈ 0.268 + 0.789
n
− 1.732
24n2
.
Alternatively, the size n of a society achieving a given approval number a(S) is
bounded above by
(4.3) n ≤
⌊
2a(S)− 3
2
+
√
3(a(S))2 − 5a(S) + 9
4
⌋
.
Proof. Let Ai and A
′
i represent the left and right intervals, respectively, of
voter i’s approval set in the n-voter society S. Without loss of generality we may
assume no two interval endpoints coincide. For any interval I, define numbers L(I),
R(I), B(I), and C(I) to keep track of the number of other intervals that intersect I
in various ways. Let L(I) count the number of other intervals that, of two endpoints
of I, contain only the left endpoint. Let R(I) count the number of other intervals
that, of two endpoints of I, contain only the right endpoint. Let B(I) count the
number of other intervals that contain both endpoints of I. Let C(I) count the
number of other intervals that intersect I but contain neither endpoint of I, and
are hence in the “center” of I.
For example, in Figure 1, we see that L(A′) = 2, R(A′) = 0, C(A′) = 3, and
B(A′) = 0. Also L(C ′) = 0, R(C ′) = 1, C(C ′) = 0, and B(C ′) = 1. Since each set
must intersect all n− 1 other sets,
L(Ai) + L(A
′
i) +R(Ai) +R(A
′
i) + C(Ai) + C(A
′
i) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i) ≥ n− 1.
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Then clearly
n∑
i=1
[L(Ai) + L(A
′
i) +R(Ai) +R(A
′
i) + C(A
′
i) + C(Ai) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)]
≥ n(n− 1).(4.4)
Note that an interval J covers both endpoints of another interval I and con-
tributes 1 to the count B(I) exactly when I is the in the center of J and contributes
1 to the count C(J). This implies:
(4.5)
n∑
i=1
[B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)] =
n∑
i=1
[C(Ai) + C(A
′
i)] .
Notice that given an approval number a(S), each interval may have at most
a(S)− 1 other sets intersecting its left endpoint. This gives an initial bound
n∑
i=1
[L(Ai) + L(A
′
i) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)] ≤ 2n(a(S)− 1).
and similarly, considering right endpoints:
n∑
i=1
[R(Ai) +R(A
′
i) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)] ≤ 2n(a(S)− 1).
However, if the 2n intervals are ordered by the left endpoint, then the kth interval
under this ordering from left to right can have at most k − 1 intervals intersecting
its left endpoint, not a(S) − 1. Thus we need to adjust the formulas above, to
obtain:
n∑
i=1
[L(Ai) + L(A
′
i) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)] ≤ 2n(a(S)− 1)−
a(S)(a(S)− 1)
2
,
n∑
i=1
[R(Ai) +R(A
′
i) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)] ≤ 2n(a(S)− 1)−
a(S)(a(S)− 1)
2
.
Adding these equations and applying equation (4.5) yields
n∑
i=1
[L(Ai) + L(A
′
i) +R(Ai) +R(A
′
i) + C(A
′
i) + C(Ai) +B(Ai) +B(A
′
i)]
≤ 4n(a(S)− 1)− a(S)(a(S)− 1).
So by equation (4.4), we see
(4n− a(S))(a(S)− 1) ≥ n(n− 1).
Solving this quadratic inequality for a(S), and rounding up to the nearest integer
gives the conclusion (4.1). Using (1 − x)1/2 ≤ 1 − (1/2)x gives conclusion (4.2).
Solving the quadratic inequality for n and rounding down gives the conclusion
(4.3). 
Values of a(S) and the corresponding bounds on n and the approval ratio
derived from equation (4.3) are given in Table 1.
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a(S) n Approval Observed Observed
Ratio n Approval Ratio
2 ≤ 4 ≥ 0.500 4 0.500
3 ≤ 8 ≥ 0.375 8 0.375
4 ≤ 12 ≥ 0.333 12 0.333
5 ≤ 15 ≥ 0.333 15 0.333
6 ≤ 19 ≥ 0.316 18 0.333
7 ≤ 23 ≥ 0.304 21 0.333
8 ≤ 26 ≥ 0.308 24 0.333
9 ≤ 30 ≥ 0.300 27 0.333
10 ≤ 34 ≥ 0.294 30 0.333
11 ≤ 38 ≥ 0.289 32 0.344
12 ≤ 41 ≥ 0.293 35 0.343
Table 1. On the left, this table shows for a given approval number
the largest n that is given by inequality (4.3) as well as the resulting
bound on the approval ratio derived from inequality (4.1). On
the right, this table shows, for a given approval number, known
examples of the largest n that has this approval number and the
observed approval ratio in that case, obtained by a modification of
a double-n string construction.
5. Modifying double-n string societies
In this section we give an example of a double-interval society with an approval
ratio lower than the bound given by Theorem 3.6, thus showing that double-n
strings do not always provide examples of societies with minimal approval ratios.
We will require a new notation, called the endpoint representation of a society. We
will encode a society as a sequence of symbols (corresponding to the approval sets)
representing the order of the endpoints of all the approval sets, each prefixed by
a “+” or a “−’ to denote a left or right endpoint respectively. For example, the
society in Figure 1 is represented as
+A+ C +B −A+D − C +A−B −D + C +B − C +D −B −D −A.
Proposition 5.1. There exists a society of size n = 8 with approval number
3. Hence there exist n for which double-n strings do not produce the lowest possible
approval numbers.
The society shown in Figure 5 provides such a society. This example was
derived from the double-8 string
ABCDEFGHEADFCGBH.
If each interval in the string overlaps two intervals on each side, this arrangement
is missing the adjacencies AG, BE, BF , CA, DG, DG and CH and has duplicate
adjacencies BC, CD, DC, DE, DF , EG, FG, and GH. By doing a series of moves
that interchanges endpoints in such a way as to introduce missing adjacencies (at
the expense of duplicate adjacencies) without increasing the approval number, we
10 M. KLAWE, K.L. NYMAN, J.N. SCOTT, AND F.E. SU
A
A
B
B
C
C
D
D
E
E
F
F
G
G
H
H
Figure 5. A society of size 8 with approval number 3.
arrive at the society
+A+B + C −A+ E −B +D − C +G−D + F − E +H − F +A−G
+E − E +D −H + F −A+B −D + C − F +G−G+H − C −B −H.
We note that an example like this with n = 8 and a(S) = 3 cannot be achieved
by a double-n string since the first symbol in a double-n string with diameter d
is adjacent to at most 3d other symbols. Thus, as in Lemma 3.2, we have n ≤
3d+ 1 = 3(a(S)− 1) + 1, and so the approval number of a double-8 string must be
at least 4.
It is not clear how to systematically interchange endpoints to achieve all possible
adjacencies. However, an algorithm which aims at making “smart” swaps produced
societies with approval ratios given in Table 1. A description of the algorithm can
be found in [4]. The results of the hill-climbing algorithm in Figure 6 suggest that
the asymptotic approval ratio should be 1/3.
6. Conclusion and Open Questions
We have studied pairwise-intersecting double-interval societies, and determined
bounds for the minimum guaranteed approval ratio for such societies. Such ques-
tions naturally motivated the study of double-n strings, which represent certain
special double-interval societies with low approval ratios. Although these do not
necessarily provide the smallest such ratios, all of the known examples that provide
smaller ratios come from modifying the double-n string construction.
There are numerous open questions.
• For double-n strings, is there a systematic way to construct strings of the
smallest diameter?
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a(S)=3, n=8, AR=0.375: +A+B+F-F+G-A+F-B+C-C+D-G+E-D+H-F+G-G+A-E+D-H
+C-A+B-D+E-E+H-H-B-C
a(S)=4, n=12, AR=0.333: +A+B+C+F-C+H-B+L-L+G-G+I-F+D-A+C-H+L-D+E-E+J
-I+G-J+K-C+B-L+I-I+D-K+E-G+J-B+F-D+K-F+A-A+H
-K-E-H-J
a(S)=5, n=15, AR=0.333: +A+B+C+D+E-C+G-A+O-G+F-D+K-F+J-J+N-E+C-B+A-O
+D-K+H-H+M-N+J-M+L-L+I-D+F-A+G-C+N-I+L-N+H-J
+M-F+K-G+I-K+B-B+E-E+O-H-M-I-L-O
a(S)=6, n=18, AR=0.333: +A+B+C+D+E+G-A+M-C+K-G+Q-Q+P-P+O-O+J-D+F-E+A
-B+C-F+P-K+I-I+R-M+O-R+H-H+L-J+Q-L+N-A+G-C+J
-J+F-P+I-O+R-N+H-Q+L-G+D-F+N-D+K-K+B-B+E-R+M
-N-M-E-H-L-I
a(S)=7, n=21, AR=0.333: +A+B+C+D+E+F+I-A+K-K+N-N+R-R+G-E+T-B+J-T+U-G
+Q-D+B-I+P-Q+M-C+H-F+L-J+S-U+O-B+D-D+C-C+I-I
+F-F+G-P+Q-M+R-L+J-S+N-O+K-H+A-G+E-J+T-Q+P-P
+M-M+U-R+S-S+O-U+L-N+H-T-H-K-L-E-O-A
a(S)=8, n=24, AR=0.333: +A+B+C+D+E+F+G+L-G+N-C+O-F+Q-O+M-N+T-B+H-H+K
-Q+I-I+U-U+X-D+J-L+F-A+O-E+C-J+G-M+P-T+U-P+H
-K+W-X+I-W+R-R+V-V+S-O+Q-C+J-F+N-G+B-U+X-S+P
-H+R-I+V-X+W-Q+K-B+D-J+T-N+S-D+L-T+M-K+A-L+E
-P-A-W-S-E-M-V-R
Figure 6. Output pairwise-intersection double-interval societies
with given sizes and approval ratios found by a heuristic algorithm.
Here AR denotes the approval ratio.
• Beyond double-n strings, is there a better general construction that yields
societies with the lowest approval ratios?
• With double-n strings, we currently have ∆ bounded by 0.348 ≤ ∆ ≤
0.385. Can we tighten the bounds on ∆?
• What results can be obtained for triple-interval societies?
• What about higher-dimensional approval sets? What can be said if each
voter’s approval set consists of two convex sets in the plane?
Finally, we end with our initial conjecture, which now has more evidence as
support.
Conjecture. For all pairwise-intersecting double-interval societies S, the ap-
proval ratio
a(S)
n
≥ 1
3
.
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